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AbstrACt
This study is the first attempt to empirically investigate the determinants 
of corporate demand for Islamic insurance (takaful) using data from 
main board of public listed companies at Bursa Malaysia. Factors like 
leverage, growth opportunities, expected bankruptcy costs, company 
size, managerial ownership, tax considerations and regulated effects 
have been examined in this study. The data covers a five-year period 
from year 2002 – 2006. The findings show that leverage, expected 
bankruptcy costs, tax considerations, company size, and managerial 
ownership play an important role in determining the corporate demand 
for Islamic insurance in Malaysia. Our conclusions are robust to 
alternative specifications model of GLS with Fixed Effects that help us 
to control for unobservable heterogeneity.
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INtrODUCtION
In Malaysia, the government entrusted Bank Negara Malaysia (The Central Bank) 
with the regulatory and supervisory role over the conventional and Islamic insurance 
(takaful) industries1.  Islamic and conventional insurance are two different contracts. 
Islamic insurance which is known as takaful is based on the concept of takaful that 
is developed on three principles: 1) Mutual responsibility 2) Co-operation with each 
other 3) Protecting one another from any kind of difficulties, disasters and other 
misfortune whereby the financial contribution (premium) is based on the concept 
* Corresponding author: Email: mdah@ukm.my
1 The Central Bank and the Financial System in Malaysia – A Decade of Change (1989-1999), p. 
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of tabarru’ (Jamil Osman, 2003).  The word takaful is derived from the Arabic word 
kafala which means to guarantee, look after or trust.  The noun takaful is derived 
from verb takafala which can be literally translated as “helping one another” or 
“looking after one another”2.  Tabarru’ is derived from the Arabic noun that means 
donation, gift and contribution (Mohd. Ma’sum Billah, 2001).  In relation to this, 
a participant agrees to contribute as tabarru’, undertakes to pay thus enable him 
to fulfil his obligation of mutual help and joint guarantee should any of his fellow 
participants suffer a defined loss (Mohd. Fadzli Yusof, 1996).
Conventional Insurance is a contract in which one person (the insurer) 
undertakes in return for the agreed consideration (premium) to pay to another person 
(the insured), a sum of money (the indemnity) on the happening of a specified event 
(Dorfman, 2003).  It is generally accepted by Muslim jurists that the operation 
of conventional insurance does not conform to the rules and requirements of the 
Shariah.  Conventional insurance involves elements of uncertainty (Al-gharar) in 
the contract of insurance, gambling (Al-maysir) as the consequence of the presence 
of uncertainty and interest (Al-riba) in the investment activities of the conventional 
insurance companies which contravene the rules of the Shariah3.  However, 
takaful and conventional insurance have more or less the same characteristics, for 
example, in terms of the nature of their businesses, products and services offered 
like underwriting procedures and claims considerations as well as reinsurance 
mechanism.  The only and major difference is that, takaful is based on the shariah 
law, while conventional insurance does not.
The general takaful industry in Malaysia has recorded progressive growth, 
particularly over the last six years.  Demand for general takaful products has 
continuously risen, as is evident from the improvement in contributions (premiums) 
of general takaful.  For example, total net contributions for general takaful expanded 
by a double-digit growth rate at an average of 19.2% annually, to register RM356.6 
million in 20054.  An interesting fact is that, Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad (The 
first Islamic Insurance Company in Malaysia) is among the top four companies in 
the insurance industry in Malaysia.  For example, the company secured contributions 
(premiums) of about RM600 million in 2003.  In addition, STMB ranked first in 
2003 in fire takaful business in the insurance and takaful industry, collecting a 
contribution of RM132 million (Salahuddin Ahmed, 2006).  The data also indicate 
that over 50 percent of total premium are from the business corporation for general 
takaful business.  Therefore, it is important to highlight what are the factors affecting 
the corporate demand for takaful in Malaysia? Research should also be conducted 
2 Mohammad Daud Bakar, “The Problem of Risk and Insurable Interest in Takaful: A Jurisprudential 
Analysis”; A paper presented at the 4th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Banking, 
Loughborough University, UK, August 13-15,2000. pp 179-193. 
3 Ibid  p. 256
4 Concept and Operation of General Takaful Business in Malaysia, by Bank Negara Malaysia (2006) 
p. 7
280
International Journal of Economics and Management
to investigate the determinants of corporate demand for takaful in Malaysia since 
there has been no research in this area in Malaysia.  Moreover, empirical research 
conducted on takaful is still quite scarce since its existence of more than 20 years 
in Malaysia.  This research will focus on property or asset-based takaful due to 
properties or assets are the majority of risk exposures insured by the corporations. 
However, none of the empirical studies in this area of research have been explored 
in takaful.  Due to the limited literature and empirical evidence on the topic, it is 
believed that the related studies, focusing on its alternative in the conventional 
insurance sector, specifically property insurance, would also be able to provide us 
with some useful insights and information on the factors affecting corporate demand 
for takaful.  This is in line with a previous study like that of Norlida Abd. Manab 
et al. (2004), who use related studies focusing on its alternative conventional life 
insurance literature and apply them to a study of the awareness and ownership of 
family takaful schemes among the Muslim community in Malaysia.
The majority of empirical studies focused upon identifying the factors 
affecting corporate demand for property insurance.  Their studies try to find the 
relationship of these factors with property insurance, whether they are significantly 
or insignificantly related with property insurance and then whether they are 
positively or negatively related with property insurance (Yamori, 1999; Hoyt and 
Khang, 2000; Zou, Adam and Buckle, 2003; Daniel and Paul, 2003; Zou and Adam, 
2006).  Among the factors affecting corporate insurance that has been studied 
are; Underinvestment problem and leverage, Growth opportunities, Managerial 
Ownership, Tax consideration, Expected bankruptcy costs, Company size and 
Regulatory environment.  It is therefore, this study would like to examine the 
above mentioned factors affecting corporate demand for takaful by public listed 
companies of main board at Bursa Malaysia.
Our study will contribute to the existing literature where it will extend to study 
on the corporate demand for takaful.  In contrast of all other previous studies like 
Mayers and Smith (1990), Yamori (1999), Hoyt and Khang (2000), Zou, Adam and 
Buckle (2003), Daniel and Paul (2003) and Zou and Adam (2005 & 2006) were 
study the corporate demand for conventional insurance only.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses the 
literature review.  Section 3 describes the research design, followed by the analysis 
of findings in Section 4.  The final section provides the conclusion of the study and 
suggestion for future research.
LItErAtUtE rEVIEW
Few studies have been conducted on the corporate demand for property insurance. 
This is mainly due to the lack of public information on insurance data at the firm 
level.  Mayers and Smith (1990), Yamori (1999), Hoyt and Khang, (2000), Zou, 
Adams and Buckle (2003), Daniel and Paul (2003) and Zou & Adams (2006) 
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are among the empirical studies on the corporate demand for insurance.  Mayers 
and Smith (1990) was the first empirical study of the determinants of reinsurance 
purchasing behaviour of insurance companies.  In this study they examine 
reinsurance purchases for a sample of United States (US) based property and 
casualty insurance companies because such data are systematically reported in 
insurers’ statutory returns.  The empirical model employed in their study uses the 
ratio of reinsurance ceded to total business premium received as the dependent 
variable.  Company characteristics such as size, degree of concentration in insurance 
lines, extent of geographic concentration and best rating are used as independent 
variables.  They find that ownership structure, size, line of business concentration, 
geographical location and default risk show significant effects.  However, due 
to data limitations, many factors like growth opportunities and tax are absent 
from their analysis and some variables specific to the insurance industry.  Since 
only one industry i.e. the insurance industry is considered, it is difficult to make 
meaningful inferences about the insurance purchasing behaviour of other firms. 
In other words, their study fails to provide evidence of the insurance purchasing 
behaviour of non-insurance companies.  In addition, as described by Mayers and 
Smith (1990) reinsurance purchases from another member of the same group are 
not distinguished from external purchases.  That is, the actual retention is included 
in reinsurance purchases.  The limitations described here could be mitigated with 
the use of data for industrial firms.
Yamori (1999) studies this area of research by focusing on the demand for 
corporate insurance in Japan for 504 industrial companies using 1986 data only 
due to the availability of published insurance premium data.  His study shows 
that size and regulatory status appear to be important factors in the demand 
for corporate insurance.  Some potentially important determinants of insurance 
purchase like growth opportunities and expected bankruptcy were absent from 
his study.  Moreover, this study uses time specific data (1986 only) on a cross 
sectional analysis that might limit the empirical results to some extent.  The OLS 
methods of cross sectional estimation methods assume that all firms have the same 
behaviour in making decisions to protect their property against insurable risks. 
These assumptions of uniform behaviour deny any form of heterogeneity, which 
is, in practice, very likely to prevail.  Thus, cross section and time-series data is 
also useful to be considered to differentiate among individuals in recognition 
of the fact that each individual, or cross sectional unit, may have some special 
characteristics of its own.
Hoyt and Khang (2000) was the first study to test a full set of determinants 
of the corporate demand for property insurance by using insurance premium data 
from a questionnaire survey distributed to 251 public listed (NYSE) companies 
for 1989.  They discover that leverage, firm size, growth opportunities and tax 
consideration have a significant impact on the factors for the demand of corporate 
insurance.  However, this study also only focuses on one year specific data (1989 
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only) that could also limit their empirical results to some extent.
Zou, Adams and Buckle (2003) analyze panel data for 235 companies in China 
by using insurance premium data from a telephone survey and financial data from 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
in China.  The period of data was from 1997 – 1999.  The companies were divided 
into systematic and unsystematic risks based on the performance of the stocks 
of the companies.  They employ a two-stage analytical approach to address the 
question of the determinants of the participation and volume insurance purchasing 
decisions.  Their study indicates that the managerial decision to purchase property 
insurance is positively related to company size, insolvency risks and geographical 
concentrations.  In contrast, the amount of property insurance purchased is positively 
related to systematic risks but negatively related to insolvency risk and unsystematic 
risks company size and leverage.  However, as they mentioned in their study that the 
interpretation of their results might be tempered by a recognition of the limitations 
in their study such as the short time series of data used, 3 years only (1997-1999) 
and potential endogeneity issue.
Daniel and Paul (2003) explore the data on property insurance in the United 
States (US) from 1991 through 2002.The data for insurance was from SwissRe, one 
of the world’s largest insurance companies and the financial data was collected from 
Compustat of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  Due to insufficient 
quality in the data, they ignore a large part of the available contracts and perform 
the analysis with 180 firm-year observations.  They use excess value as a proxy 
for corporate insurance demand.  They find that expected default costs and size 
play an important role in determining property insurance.  They argue that a major 
strength of their analysis compared to previous studies by Yamori (1999), Hoyt and 
Khang (2000) and Zou, Adams and Buckle (2003) is that they observe corporate 
choices for the excess value of property insurance as a proxy of demand.  Yamori 
(1999), Hoyt and Khang (2000) and Zou, Adams and Buckle (2003) rely on the 
insurance premium as a proxy for demand.  Under an excess, the insurer does not 
participate in the loss until the actual loss exceeds a certain amount (Rejda, 2005). 
This means that excess is a first amount of loss that should be borne by the insured 
in the event of loss.  Some property insurance policies impose voluntarily excess and 
some property insurance policies impose compulsory excess.  Thus, it is believed 
that an accurate proxy to measure property insurance demand is premium that is 
calculated depending on the nature and types of risk which is based on underwriting 
principles of insurance.  Therefore, Daniel and Paul (2003) who use excess value 
as a proxy for insurance demand is not accurate to justify the corporate behaviour 
of property insurance.
Zou and Adams (2005) use insurance data sets for 698 Chinese publicly 
listed companies for the period 1997-2003 where the study tests the simultaneous 
linkage among debt capacity, cost of debt and corporate property insurance.  Their 
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results suggest that debt capacity, cost of debt and corporate insurance appear to 
be simultaneously related.  This study is a follow-up and extension of research by 
Zou et al. (2003) using the Simultaneous Equation Method (SEM) of analysis.
Zou and Adams (2006) again analyze the panel data (1997 – 1999) for 235 
publicly listed companies in the Peoples Republic of China without segregating 
the companies into systematic and unsystematic risk types of companies as in their 
previous study (Zou et al., 2003).  They analyze all the factors suggested by Hoyt 
and Khang (2000) and add some additional factors like geographical location and 
other ownership structures (e.g. foreign ownership and state ownership).  Their 
results suggest that the decision to use property insurance is positively related to 
leverage but negatively related to state ownership and tax.  In contrast, the volume 
of property insurance purchased is positively related to managerial ownership and 
growth options but inversely related to size.  Again, as they mentioned in their 
study, the interpretation of their results might be tempered by recognition of the 
limitations in their study such as the short time series of data used, which was 3 
years only (1997 – 1999), and the potential endogeneity issue.  Moreover, unlike 
the managerial ownership factor, some additional factors that have been included 
in the study like foreign and state ownership were actually not strongly developed 
in the financial theory to relate and fill the gap between the irrelevance of results 
derived from the benchmark of perfect capital markets (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958) and the practical importance of risk management decisions on insurance in 
modern corporations.
rEsEArCH DEsIGN AND HYPOtHEsEs 
DEVELOPMENt
Data Description
Data is divided into two categories, namely a) Dependent variables: takaful 
contribution ratio b) Independent variables: Financial data.  The takaful and financial 
data are collected on an individual firm basis from public listed companies in the 
main board of Bursa Malaysia excluding finance sector.  The data covers a five-year 
period from year 2002 – 2006.  There are 112 public listed companies on the main 
board which have been identified to have the property takaful coverage with the 
two takaful companies.  Out of the 112 companies, 44 companies were excluded 
because of having property insurance with takaful for less than 3 years, missing 
information on the annual reports for more than 2 years of 5-year period of study 
and insufficient data on Data Stream International software.  The final number of 
companies is 68 companies for the period of 2002 – 2006.  We use an unbalanced 
firm-level panel data set of 68 public listed companies at Bursa Malaysia in which 
their properties are insured using Islamic insurance.  Property takaful premium 
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(known as takaful contribution) will be used as a proxy for demand which is as a 
dependent variable.  The data is collected from two takaful companies in Malaysia. 
Previous studies like Yamori (1999); Hoyt and Khang (2000); Zou, Adams and 
Buckle (2003) and Zou and Adam (2005 and 2006) also used insurance premium 
as a proxy for the demand.
The amount of takaful premium by a firm is represented by the ratio of 
property takaful premium to the value of insurable assets.  The amount of lands 
is subtracted because they are not usually subject to insurance.  This is according 
to the Replacement or Reinstatement Basis Clause stated in takaful or insurance 
policy.  Previous studies like Hoyt and Khang (2000), Zou, Adam and Buckle 
(2003) and Zou & Adam (2005 and 2006) used this kind of formula to constitute 
the denominator of dependent variable.
The financial data of public listed companies are considered as measurable 
variables (independent variables).  The ownership data are obtained directly from 
company’s annual report.  Other firm’s financial data on the other hand, are collected 
from DataStream International, a financial database provider.  The financial data 
and hypotheses statements are developed as follows:
Financial Data and Hypotheses Development
Leverage: Debt / Equity ratio
A general characteristic of the claims of bondholders is that bondholders must be 
paid before the shareholders of the firm receive any funds.  This characteristic can 
distort the investment choices of shareholders following a major loss in two ways. 
First, shareholders sometimes will have an incentive to forego good investment 
projects (positive Net Present Value) following a loss that causes a firm to experience 
financial distress.  Second, shareholders may have an incentive to invest in some 
negative net present value projects with high risk.
Some positive net present value projects may not be undertaken following a 
major loss that causes financial distress because the returns from the new investment 
will mostly accrue to the bondholder who must be paid before the shareholders. 
This is known as the underinvestment problem (Mayers and Smith, 1982).  Suppose 
that a corporation experiences a major disaster like fire that destroys its plant, the 
corporation will be unable to pay its bondholders or lenders what they were promised 
unless the corporation replaces the plant.  The shareholder of the corporation, 
however, may be reluctant to pay for the replacement after the fire even if the cost 
of replacement is less than the total returns from the replacement.  The reason is 
that the returns from the replacement following the fire will mostly accrue to the 
bondholders.  That is, replacement bails out the bondholders.  Property insurance 
like fire insurance would provide the funds necessary to replace the equipment and, 
therefore, commit the shareholders to replacement following a major disaster like 
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fire.  Since insurance commits the firm to replacement which alleviates bondholders’ 
concern about being paid following a loss.  Bondholders or lenders, therefore, are 
willing to lend money at lower rates when the firm is insured.
Mayers and Smith (1987) also state that one possible solution to this 
underinvestment problem involves bonding the investment decision through the 
purchase of insurance.  Thus, a firm that has more debt in its capital structure 
would purchase more insurance against its firm specific risks.  In other words, the 
purchase of property insurance could be affected by a firm’s capital structure i.e. 
financial leverage.  Debt-equity ratio is used as a proxy for leverage.  Previous 
studies which use this ratio include Hoyt and Khang (2000), Zou et al. (2003), 
Daniel and Paul (2003) and Zou and Adams (2006).  Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is proposed for takaful:
Hypothesis 1: High leverage firms are likely to contribute more to takaful. 
Therefore, leverage is expected to be positively related with 
takaful.
Growth Opportunities: Market to Book Value
According to Froot et al. (1993), the purchase of property insurance not only reduces 
the risk of financial distress, but it can also lower the incidence of cash flow shortfalls 
following a major accidental loss that could scaling down of potentially value 
enhancing investment i.e. the so-called underinvestment problem.  Thus, this study 
expects a positive relation between growth opportunities and property insurance. 
The market to book value ratio will be used as a proxy for growth opportunities 
in line with previous studies like Zou, Adams and Buckle (2003), Daniel and Paul 
(2003) and Zou and Adams (2005).  Accordingly, this study measures the market 
to book value as the ratio of book value plus convertible debt and preferred stock 
plus the market value of equity divided by total assets.  Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is proposed for takaful:
Hypothesis 2: High growth-opportunities firms are likely to contribute more 
to takaful. Therefore, growth opportunities are expected to be 
positively related with takaful.
Expected Bankruptcy costs: Working capital to Total Assets ratio, 
Long-term debt ratio and Interest Coverage ratio
The bankruptcy related literature (Altman, 1968 and Ohlson, 1980) suggests that 
a proxy that is the most appropriate for measuring the probability of bankruptcy is 
the ratio of working capital to total assets.  This implies that a negative sign for this 
proxy with respect to insurance premium can be expected.  Other studies like Hoyt 
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and Khang (2000) and Daniel and Paul (2003) also use the formula to measure the 
probability of bankruptcy.  Daniel and Paul (2003) add two more variables to address 
the influence of expected default costs on insurance demand.  These variables are the 
interest coverage ratio and the long-term debt ratio.  Interest coverage ratio could 
proxy for a firm’s insolvency risk.  It is believed that the higher a firm’s interest 
coverage ratio and the lower its long-term debt ratio, the greater is the probability 
of default.  Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed for takaful: 
Working capital to Total Assets ratio• 
Hypothesis 3a: Highly expected bankruptcy costs firms (small firms) are likely to 
contribute more to takaful.  Therefore, expected bankruptcy costs 
are expected to be negatively related with takaful.
Interest coverage ratio (Earning Before Interest & Tax / Interest), and Long-term • 
debt ratio (Long Term Debt / Total Assets)
Hypothesis 3b: It is believed that the higher a firm’s interest coverage ratio, the 
lower its long-term debt ratio.  Therefore, there will be a positive 
relationship between interest coverage ratio and takaful demand 
and a negative relationship between long term debt ratio and 
takaful demand.
Tax Considerations:  Total Depreciations to Total Fixed Assets
According to Hoyt and Khang (2000), the purchase of property insurance has two 
effects.  First, the firm is able to deduct the insurance premium when calculating 
taxable earnings, regardless of whether a loss occurs.  Second, if a loss occurs, the 
firm will have to recognize a capital gain equal to the insurance indemnity payment. 
If the income tax rate exceeds the capital gains tax rate, the income tax savings from 
deducting the premium exceed the expected capital gains tax payment.  Hoyt and 
Khang (2000) suggest that the larger the amount of depreciation of a firm’s asset, the 
greater will be the demand for insurance and the greater the reduction in the payment 
of tax.  The statement may be supported by the fact that most fixed assets of the firm 
are insured on a replacement cost basis, according to the 1990 Cost of Risk Survey 
(Hoyt and Khang, 2000).  Hoyt and Khang (2000) use the ratio of depreciation to 
fixed assets to show the relationship between insurance and depreciated property. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed for takaful: 
Hypothesis 4: Firms with higher depreciated property are likely to contribute 
more to takaful.  Therefore, depreciated property is expected to 
be positively related with takaful.
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Managerial Ownership: The proportion of shares owned by 
managers
Two conflicting inferences are possible on the corporate demand for insurance 
reported in the finance literature when the management compensation is a function 
of a firm’s value (Mayers and Smith, 1982 & 1987).  The two competing hypotheses 
are the managerial risk-aversion and incentive-alignment hypotheses.  According to 
the managerial risk-aversion hypothesis, when the bankruptcy probability of a firm 
is extremely low, the manager is inclined to purchase less insurance if the portion 
of holdings of common stocks and stock options is relatively large (Smith and 
Stulz, 1985).  On the other hand, incentive-alignment hypothesis mentioned that if 
the bankruptcy risk is relatively high, the manager may have a strong incentive to 
buy more insurance regardless of his or her holdings of common stocks and stock 
options (Smith and Stulz, 1985).  Therefore, the influence of managerial stock and 
option holdings (managerial ownership) is ambiguous (Daniel and Paul, 2003). 
Most of the studies offer no prediction as to the direction of managerial ownership 
but leave it as an issue for empirical investigation. 
However, Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that as the ownership of managers 
increases, they are expected to become more risk averse because they have more 
financial interest in the company.  As a result, managers are likely to pursue risk 
management activities through insurance in order to reduce the risk of bankruptcy 
following major accidental losses.  The ratio of common stocks held by company 
managers to the total number of common stocks issued is used to measure the 
managerial ownership effect of the corporate decision on insurance ( Hoyt and 
Khang, 2000; Zou, Adams and Buckle, 2003; Daniel and Paul, 2003 and Zou and 
Adams 2006).  Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed for takaful:
Hypothesis 5: Firms with high levels of managerial ownership are likely to 
contribute more to property takaful.  Therefore, managerial 
ownership is expected to be positively related with takaful
Company Size and Insurer’s Risk Management Services: The 
Natural Logarithm of Total Assets 
Previous study like Hoyt and Khang (2000) supports the inverse relation between 
company size and the corporate decision to purchase insurance where small 
companies are more likely to purchase property insurance than large companies. 
According to Mayers and Smith (1990), smaller firms can gain more from insurers’ 
risk management services than the larger firms.  Firm size is measured by total 
assets which could affect the amount of insurance purchased by the firm.  This study 
follows other studies like Hoyt and Khang (2000), Yamori (1999) Zou et al. (2003), 
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Daniel and Paul (2003) and Zou and Adams (2006) using the natural logarithm of 
total asset.  Therefore, the following hypothesis for takaful is proposed:
Hypothesis 6: Small Companies are likely to contribute more to takaful.  Therefore, 
small size is expected to be negatively related with takaful
Regulatory environment: Dummy (1, if the firm is in a regulated 
industry, 0, otherwise)
This study follows regulated industry suggested by Yamori (1999) and Hoyt and 
Khang (2000) i.e.  Utility industry and oil and gas industry are also considered as 
highly price regulated industries in Malaysia.  Thus, a dummy variable is 1 if a 
firm is classified into regulated industry and zero if classified otherwise.  However, 
previous studies like Hoyt and Khang (2000), Zou et al. (2003) and Daniel and 
Paul (2003) show that financial theory does not make any clear prediction as to 
whether regulation has an effect on property insurance.  Hoyt and Khang (2000) 
also argue that contradictory hypotheses exist as described in the theoretical 
background.  However, this study has revisited the possible relationship proposed 
by Mayers and Smith (1982) where firms in a regulated industry would purchase 
more insurance than those in an unregulated industry.  Therefore, the following 
hypothesis for takaful is proposed:
Hypothesis 7: Regulated firms are likely to contribute more to takaful.  Therefore, 
regulatory environment is expected to be positively related with 
takaful
Methodology
A pooled combination of cross sectional and time series that incorporates non-effect, 
fixed effect and random effect for both time and specific correlation are deployed. 
Thus, this study would employ a cross-sectional and time-series regression model 
using panel data.  The model has the following functional form:
Property Takaful Contribution = ƒ (Leverage, Growth Opportunities, 
Bankruptcy Costs, Regulated Industries, Managerial Ownership, Company Size, 
Tax Considerations).
Hence, the following general model will be used to verify the determinants 
of corporate demand for takaful (CDT).  The general estimation model can be 
specified as follows:
TCRit = C + 1DERit + 2MBVRit + 3WCRit + 4ICVRit + 5LTDRit + 6DEPit + 7MOWNit + 8LNTAit 
+ 9REGDMYit + εit
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Definition of Variables;
Variable definitions:
TCR = The ratio of property takaful contribution to insurable assets
DER = Debt / Equity ratio
MBVR = Market to Book Value ratio: the ratio of book value plus convertible 
debt and preferred stock plus the market value of equity divided by 
total assets.
WCR = Working capital to Total Assets ratio
ICVR = Interest Coverage ratio : Earning Before Interest & Tax / Interest
LTDR = Long-term debt ratio: Long-term debt / Total Assets
DEP = Total Accumulated Depreciation / Total Fixed Assets
MOWN = Managerial Ownership: The proportion of shares owned by managers
LNTA = Natural Log of total assets
REGD = Regulated Industry (1, if the firm is in a regulated industry, 0, 
otherwise)
ε = Error term
i = i th firm
t = t th period
The general estimation models are divided into three specific models as 
follows:
Model 1•	 : Non Effect Model: It assumes that the slope and intercept of firms 
are constant across individuals and time. 
Model 2: Fixed Effects Model:•	  The fixed effect model treats omitted 
(unobservable) firm-specific variables as constant over period specific variables 
as invariant across companies.  In the fixed effects model, the intercept in the 
regression model is allowed to differ among individuals in recognition of 
the fact that each individual, or cross sectional unit, may have some special 
characteristics of its own.
Model 3: random Effects Model: •	 The random effects model treats both firm 
and period specific factors as random.  By following steps suggested by Gujerati 
(2003), instead of treating i0a  for model CDT as fixed, it is assumed that it is 
a random variable with a mean value of 0a  (no subscript i) and the intercept 
value for an individual firm.
However, the choice between the fixed and random effects models involves a 
trade-off between the degrees of freedom lost due to the dummy variable approach 
in the fixed effects model and the treatment of individual effects as uncorrelated with 
other regressors, as in the random effects formulation.  Testing the orthogonality 
of the random effects and the regressors is thus important.  The usual procedure is 
to use the Hausman test statistic for the difference between the fixed effects and 
random effects estimates, as suggested by Hsiao (2003).
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ANALYsIs OF FINDINGs
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the takaful contribution ratio (TCR) and 
the firm-specific characteristics for the pooled company/year sample of 68 public 
listed companies of Bursa Malaysia for the period of 2002-2006.  Overall, Table 4.1 
shows that the value of mean and median for all variables are not the same while 
their skewness and the value of kurtosis are not equal to zero and three respectively. 
Meanwhile, the values of Jarque-Bera are significant at 1 percent level and hence, 
it rejects the hypothesis that the data are normally distributed.  Thus, this indicates 
that the sample data are not normally distributed.  This preliminary statistical 
analysis shows that the estimation on the determinants of corporate demand for 
takaful could not produce a better result using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
estimation method.  Hence, the Generalized Least Square (GLS) method is more 
appropriate and expected to yield a much better result.
table 1 Corporate Demand for Takaful (CDT)
Variables Mean Median std. Dev skewness Kurtosis Jarque-bera
TCR 0.0012 0.0009 0.0025 -12.1436 199.6210 531506.0***
DER 0.4451 0.3932 2.8216 -16.3002 285.2023 1092825***
MBVR 0.0008 0.0002 0.0018 8.4745 109.6924 158038.5***
WCR 0.1374 0.1143 0.1949 0.1361 3.5060 4.4712***
ICVR 94.9117 4.8918 942.6284 14.7894 236.6920 751384.2***
LTDR 0.1216 0.0873 0.1282 1.2215 4.0099 94.6406***
DEP 0.0137 0.0109 0.0148 0.4222 10.6918 810.8355***
MOWN 0.1172 0.0020 1.0470 17.5928 314.5459 1331130***
TA 3035.05 693.62 8949.921 5.3252 32.7576 13527.42***
REGD 0.0708 0.0000 0.2568 3.3476 12.2066 1754.834***
*** Significant at 1%
Table 2(a) presents the Pearson’s correlation coefficients among independent 
variables.  The correlation coefficients between pairs of independent variables are 
generally low suggesting that a serious collinearity problem is unlikely.  However, 
the statistically significant correlations between some of the independent variables 
reported in the table raise the possibility of multicollinearity.  Therefore, variance 
inflation factors (VIF) and condition indices are also computed to test for the 
presence of multicollinearity.  The variance decomposition proportion is considered 
high when the value exceeds 0.5 and the condition index is considered high when 
the value exceeds 30 (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980).  Kennedy (1998) suggests 
that a VIF of more than 10 indicates harmful collinearity.  The calculated VIF are 
all less than 2 and the (largest) condition indices are less than 10 as shown in table 
2(b).  Therefore, multicollinearity does not appear to be a severe problem in this 
study.
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table 2(a) Pearson’s Correlations for CDT
DEr MbVr WCr ICVr LtDr DEP MOWN tA rEGD
DER 1
MBVR .013 1
WCR .122** .137*** 1
ICVR -.010 -.035 .042 1
LTDR .226*** -.032 -.185*** -.046 1
DEP -.070 -.034 .196*** .041 -.285*** 1
MOWN .006 -.014 -.021 -.008 .092** -.049 1
TA .061 -.105** -.102** .064 .332*** .011 -.028 1
REGD .029 -.090 -.208*** -.036 .068 -.029 -.026 .423*** 1
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% *Significant at 10%
table 2(b) Collinearity Diagnostics
Condition Index VIF
DER 1.489 1.091
MBVR 1.723 1.035
WCR 1.774 1.164
ICVR 1.791 1.017
LTDR 2.028 1.365
DEP 2.210 1.137
MOWN 2.522 1.014
TA 2.741 1.424
REGD 4.664 1.291
Table 3 reports the results of the GLS regression with non effects, fixed effects 
and random effects on the corporate demand for takaful (CDT).  The estimation 
using fixed effects regression that exploits time series variation, cross-sectional 
variation in any omitted variables in this model, is captured in firm-specific intercept 
terms.  Thus, as suggested by Johnston and Dinardo (1997), this study omit the 
regulated firm dummy (REGD) from this regression because it does not vary over 
time.  Studies by Zou et al. (2003), Daniel and Paul (2003) and Zou and Adams 
(2006) also omit the regulated firm dummy in their fixed effect analysis.
Table 4 shows the results of the Chow and Hausman test.  The table exhibits the 
result of the Chow test for a pooled model (non-effect) vs a fixed-effects model, F = 
8.60, as being significant at 1% level (one-tailed), suggesting that a heterogeneous 
fixed effects model is superior to the pooled model.  While the Hausman test for 
the random-effects vs the fixed-effects model, χ2 = 17.65, is significant at 5% level 
(one-tailed), indicating that the unobservable company specific effects are correlated 
with the explanatory variables.  Thus a fixed effects model is better than a random 
effects model.  As such, the fixed effects model is also better in the estimation 
process than the other two models (non effects and random effects) in this study.
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table 3 Panel regression results
Specification Expected sign Non-Effect Fixed Effect random Effect
Constant +/- 0.00078 0.00074 0.00081
(3.12373) (20.96580)*** (2.49195)**
DER + 0.00075 0.00078 0.000808
(27.54458)*** 38.13419*** (54.81683)***
MBVR + 0.00052 -0.00395 -0.00511
(0.33949) (-1.74688)* (-0.37342)
WCR - 0.00046 0.00035 0.00063
(3.62381)*** (5.07929)*** (1.60435)
ICVR + 1.56E-08 5.32E-08 3.99E-08
(0.83261) (8.97253)*** (1.79883*)
LTDR - -0.00208 -0.00252 -0.00276
(-9.28661)*** (-17.28272)*** (-4.60224)***
DEP + 4.98E-05 0.00909 0.009719
(0.05158) (9.24419)*** (1.21349)
MOWN + 3.26E-05 4.02E-05 4.30E-05
(1.22728) (2.22066)** (3.98772)
LNTA - 5.01E-08 7.49E-08 3.19E-08
3.84068*** (6.95075)*** (1.64169)
REGD + 0.00091 0.000492
(1.74229)* (1.84322)*
N 325 325 325
R2 0.91546 0.96525 0.89151
Adj. R2 0.91201 0.95479 0.88841
F-test 165.3191*** 44.83278*** 287.6086***
DW-test 1.79103 1.84079 1.65129
Figures in the parentheses for directional prediction are t-statistics.
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% *Significant at 10%
table 4 Panel specifications tests
test statistics statistics Value p-value
Chow test for a Pooled Model vs Fixed-Effects Model F 8.6035 0.0000
Hausman test for a Random Effects vs Fixed-Effects 
Model
χ2 17.6510 0.0240
Therefore, the discussions of corporate demand for takaful is based on the 
results of the GLS with fixed effects model.  The coefficient for leverage is found 
to be positive and statistically significant at 1 percent level.  The t-statistics of 
the measure, DER indicates that the ratio of total debt to equity is significant and 
positively related to property takaful contribution.  This means that higher debt-
financing leads to greater contribution to takaful.  This supports hypothesis H1, that 
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firms with a high leverage are more likely to use property takaful than companies 
with less debt in their capital structure in order to mitigate the agency conflicts 
between the shareholder and debtholder.  This finding also indicates that takaful is 
relevant to be used to overcome the issue of the underinvestment problem which is 
consistent with the earlier findings on corporate demand for conventional insurance. 
The finding is also in line with the previous studies like Hoyt and Khang (2000).
The hypotheses 3a and 3b are the hypotheses for the expected bankruptcy costs 
factor.  Consistent with hypothesis H3b and also earlier findings on the corporate 
demand for conventional insurance, two of the measures for expected bankruptcy 
costs (ICVR and LTDR) are significant at 1 percent.  The positive and statistically 
significant at 1 percent level for ICVR and the negative and statistically significant 
at 1 percent level for LTDR which is consistent with the theory shows that when 
firms have high borrowing capacity, no underinvestment problem exists between 
firms and debtholders.  However, one of the measures for expected bankruptcy 
costs (i.e. WCR) is positive and significant at 1 percent level which contradicts 
the expected sign in H3a.  The rationale behind this finding is related to the finding 
of firms’ size factor which will be explained below.
Consistent also with the earlier finding on the corporate demand for 
conventional insurance and previous literature like Hoyt and Khang (2000), the 
tax effect hypothesis is strongly supported by the empirical evidence which is 
significant at 1 percent level and positively related to property takaful.  That is, 
the greater the amount of cumulative depreciation, firms would make more takaful 
contributions.  The explanation is similar to the conventional insurance where 
physical assets of corporations are covered based on the ‘Replacement Cost Basis’ 
with the indemnification of payment in the event of loss or disaster without taking 
into consideration the depreciation value.  That is the reason why, the higher the 
accumulated depreciation is, the lower the tax payment, and the higher the payment 
of takaful contribution.  This clause is imposed by the Malaysian General Insurance 
Association in its Fire insurance Tariff (1996).
Consistent with the hypothesis H5 and also consistent with the earlier study 
on the corporate demand for conventional insurance, the coefficient for MOWN 
is positive and statistically significant at 5 percent level on the corporate demand 
for takaful.  This finding suggests that managers with relatively high levels of 
share ownership are more likely to make more takaful contribution in managing 
assets risk when they have an interest in the firms compared with relatively low 
levels of share ownership.  This result is consistent with the empirical evidence 
of Zou and Adams (2006) but contrary to the evidence documented in Hoyt and 
Khang (2000). 
Contrary to hypothesis H6, the coefficient for size measured by the natural log 
of total assets (TA) is positive and statistically significant at 1 percent level.  It is 
supported by the earlier finding on the corporate demand for conventional insurance. 
The significant positive sign which is consistent with the finding of conventional 
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insurance strongly suggests that large corporations in Malaysia benefit more from 
the risk management services of insurers which contradicts the hypothesis.  The 
contrary sign from the evidence documented in most previous studies like Yamori 
(1999), Hoyt and Khang (2000), Zou et al. (2003), Daniel and Paul (2003) and Zou 
and Adams (2006) due to several reasons as has been explained in the corporate 
demand for conventional insurance analysis.  An example is the risk management 
programmes by the Malaysian corporations are still at the infancy and development 
stage as compared to other countries like Japan, the United States, the United 
Kingdom and China.
However, firm size is associated with the incentive to purchase insurance 
or takaful through the risk management services of insurers and also expected 
bankruptcy costs of the firms.  As mentioned before, therefore, one cannot precisely 
evaluate the practical validity of the expected bankruptcy costs argument with 
this evidence only, until observing the effects of both elements at the same time. 
The t-statistics of the measure, the ratio of working capital to total assets (WCR) 
indicates that WCR is also positive and significantly at 1 percent level related to the 
corporate demand for takaful.  This finding shows bankruptcy costs are not related 
to size in managing risks via insurance.  This implies that large firms in the sample 
of study for takaful, which are more exposed to the expected financial distress, need 
takaful to reduce the probability of incurring expected bankruptcy costs.  Besides 
that, MBVR which is a proxy of measurement for growth opportunity is negative 
and significant at 10 percent level.  Although it is significant at 10 percent, it can 
be considered that the factor is not an important determinant of the corporate 
demand for takaful.  It is worth noting that MBVR appears to be negatively related 
to property insurance, suggesting that firms might prefer to use other kinds of risk 
management mechanisms for investment in their new projects.
CONCLUsION
This paper investigates the determinants of corporate demand for property takaful 
in Malaysia by utilizing a panel data analysis of public listed companies at Bursa 
Malaysia.  A major strength of our analysis is that, we extend the study on the 
corporate demand for Islamic insurance which is known as takaful.  In contrast of 
all other previous studies like Mayers and Smith (1990), Yamori (1999), Hoyt and 
Khang (2000), Zou, Adam and Buckle (2003), Daniel and Paul (2003) and Zou and 
Adam (2005 & 2006) were only studied the corporate demand for conventional 
insurance.  We find that leverage, expected bankruptcy costs, tax consideration, 
managerial ownership and company size play an important role for determining 
the takaful demand in Malaysia.  This is an interesting results where takaful, as an 
alternative mechanism of insurance in Malaysia are also related with the theory of 
finance which has been proved in conventional insurance studies of other countries 
like US, UK, China and Japan.  However, further study should be explored for 
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corporate demand for conventional insurance in Malaysia to compare this research 
findings of corporate demand for takaful.
Our conclusions are robust to alternative specifications of the model i.e. GLS 
with Fixed Effects model that help us to control for unobservable heterogeneity. 
However, there are several implications on important parties like regulator, 
shareholders and creditors as well as the takaful operators in which they should take 
action and attention from the findings of this study despite of some important factor 
like growth opportunities show insignificant results.  For instance, insignificant 
result in growth opportunities of the corporations and the corporate decision on 
property takaful put a sign that takaful operators may wish to make better reflect 
of risk management needs of enterprises in their product innovation and market 
strategies. 
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